英语翻译CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:REFORM OF THE RURAL CREDIT COOPERA

英语翻译
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:REFORM OF THE RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES IN CHINA*
by Andrew Watson** Introduction
Since the 1950s,China's Rural Credit Cooperative system (hereafter RCC^) has,through its various institutional reorganisations,been one of the mainstays of the rural financial system.By 1998,it had developed to have the second highest level of individual savings deposits in the country after the Industrial and Commercial Bank and was perhaps the fifth largest financial institution in terms of total deposits.In theory,its core function has been to support agriculture by collecting deposits from peasants and rural collectives and by making those funds available for loans back to peasants and collectives for use in rural development.In practice,however,its institutional structure has meant that a significant proportion of its deposits have always been placed in the formal banks and used for urban and non-agricultural investment rather than being kivested in the local community.
The RCC began as a large number of individual local cooperatives,owned by its members and operated in their local interest.The elaboration of the plan system and collective farming,however,meant that after the dislocations of the Cultural Revolution,it eventually became a subservient branch of the state banking system.^ As a result,although China did not set out to abolish the RCC,as happened to the cooperative banking system in the USSR,in practice its separate existence was little more than 'in name only' [Yi Duyou,1986].
The evolution of the reforms after 1978 led to radical changes in the functions and operations of the rural financial system.Under the planned economy,the absence of free market exchanges and of diversity in production and ownership systems meant that the pattern of rural credit tended to follow a simple cycle.Credit in the first half of the year was directed through the collectives into production,and credit in the second half of the year shifted towards the commercial handling of agricultural products through the state agencies.As production loans were repaid,commercial credit increased and vice-versa.The diversification of production,the rapid growth of the rural non-agricultural sector and the emergence of a vibrant private sector after i 978 all generated a more complex set of financial demands.The growth of the rural economy both increased the amount of rural capital available and the demand for credit.As part of that process,there was a strong perception that the cooperative
* Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council.** Professor,Chinese Economies Research Centre,University of Adelaide.
MOCT^MOSTS:23-40,1998.
® 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers,Printed in the Netherlands.

利益冲突:改革农村信用合作社在中国*
由安德鲁·沃森* *介绍
20世纪50年代以来,中国农村合作金融制度(以下简称^),通过碾压混凝土,它的各种制度的重组削弱之一的农村金融体系的支柱.到1998年为止,已开发出了,可以第二次最高水平的个人储蓄存款在这个国家的工业和商业银行后,或许是第五大的金融机构的存款总额的条款.在理论上,它的核心功能已支持农业通过收集存款来自于农民和农村集体和通过让那些利用可用资金贷款给农民和集体回用于农业的发展.然而,在实践中也就意味着它的制度结构中的比例很高,其存款一直被放置在正式银行和用于城市和农村非农建设投资而不是kivested在当地社区.
碾压混凝土开始随着大量个别地方合作社,拥有会员及操作在当地的兴趣.论述了该计划的制度和集体农业,但是,这意味着后的错位的文化大革命,它最终变成了一个附庸国家银行体系的分支.^结果,尽管中国并没有宣布废除了碾压混凝土,发生在合作银行系统在苏联,在实践中存在的独立略多于的名义上的[易Duyou,1986年].
改革后的演化导致彻底的改变在1978年的功能和操作的农村金融体系.计划经济体制下,由于缺乏交流和多样性的自由市场,在生产和所有权制度意味着模式农村信贷往往都追随一个简单的周期.信用在上半年的直接通过集体投入生产,和信贷今年下半年的转向商业处理的农产品,通过州机构.作为生产贷款被偿还,商业信用增加,反之亦然.多样化的生产、快速增长的农村非农业部门并出现一个充满活力的私营部门后我都产生一个更复杂978套的金融需求.农村经济的增长的数量都增加了农村资金可以得到的,对信贷的需求.作为这一过程的一部分,有着一种强烈的感觉,合作社
*在这张纸上,得到了资金来自澳大利亚研究委员会.* *教授,中国经济研究中心、阿德莱德大学.
MOCT最为:23-40 ^,1998年.
1998年®修正的学术出版机构,印在荷兰.